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Supreme Court Decisions
Real Estate; Damages; Reservoirs; Seepage; Parties;Revivor; Judgment.
-No. 14677. Decided March 11, 194 O--ColoradoNational Bank
etc. v. Irvine, et al. District Court, Jefferson County. Hon. S. W.
Johnson, Judge. Affirmed. En Banc.
A. Plaintiffs sued L. for damages to their property reFACTS:
sulting from seepage from a reservoir alleged to have been negligently
constructed and maintained by L. on his adjoining land. L. answered,
denying liability, and as a further defense asserted that D. was the holder
of a Deed of Trust on the plaintiffs' property and consequently was
an essential party to the proceeding.
B. D intervened, and prior to trial L. died. On motion of plaintiffs, alone, an order was entered substituting L.'s executor and executrix
as defendants and they were duly served with process.
C. Jury found issues for plaintiffs and intervener and assessed
the damages. Thereafter plaintiffs assigned to intervener, D., so much
of amount recovered as would pay in full his loans on the premises to
plaintiffs.
D. Thereafter the Court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs
and against defendants, and that intervener take nothing, it being held
that "the loan held by said intervener on the premises of plaintiffs is
sufficiently secured to protect him against loss."
1. The contention of the defendants that the trial court
HELD:
erred in permitting the cause to proceed to trial and allowing the intervener to seek judgment against defendants because of the failure of intervener, individually, to move for a revivor is without merit.
2. The action did not abate by reason of L.'s death, but merely
remained in abeyance until the decedent's legal representatives were substituted as parties defendant.
3. While until such legal representatives were made parties they
were not required to take notice of the action, when such substitutiQn of
parties is made, and the legal representatives appear in the action, there
is no valid rason why an intervener therein, who supports the side of
the party bringing about the revival and who originally intervened at
the behest of the adverse party, should be required separately to additionally move for a revivor as a condition precedent to the final adjudication of the mutual controversy with the common adversary.
4. Defendants may not object to entry of judgment in favor of
plaintiffs alone, excluding intervener, where there can be no second
recovery for the same injuries.

DICTA
5. "Where permanent injury to land is alleged but one cause of
action is constituted and all the damages must be assessed in that proceeding. There can be no second recovery where permanent damages
have been so assessed."
6. Although the amount of the intervener's lien on plaintiffs'
property was $8,793.24, and the damages assessed by the jury were
$9,666.66, and the value of the property, as alleged by plaintiffs and
intervener, was only $15,000.00, the supposition that the damages
awarded were excessive is not warranted. The Court's finding that the
loan held by the intervener was sufficiently secured to protect him from
loss was undoubtedly based upon the consideration that the indebtedness was secured by the trust deed on the land as well as by the-partial
assignment of the damages.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Young, Mr. Justice
Bock and Mr. Justice Burke concur. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bouck dissent. Mr. Justice Bakke not participating.

Labor; Unions; Pickets; Transportation; Injunction; Contracts; Secondary Boycott.-No. 14671. Decided March 18, 1940-Denver
Local Union No. 13, et at. v. Perry Truck Lines, Inc., et al. District Court, Denver. Hon. Henry A. Hicks, Judge. Reversed. En
Banc.
FACTS: A. Suit by an employer, operating two truck transportation agencies, joined with eight employees to restrain defendants
from placing a picket of any kind on or near any Property of employer,
or from picketing any operation of the employer, or interfering with
shipments handled by employer, or intimidating customers, or refusing
to handle interline freight transported by employer, or boycotting employer, or conspiring against or in any manner interfering with rights
of employees of said employer to work unmolested, etc.
B. The trial court issued an ex parte temporary restraining order,
and later graihted a permanent injunction against the defendants.
HELD:
1. "The record does not disclose any force, or violence,
or any intimidation and threats thereof, an the part of the defendants:
nor is there any showing of fraud."
2. "* * * Force and violence by employees, or any organization
thereof, never can be sanctioned, and * * * orderly government cannotexist unless such force and violence, if indulged in, be suppressed by
the regularly constituted governmental agency. It is conceded that an
employer has a legal right to maintain a nonunion business, and that his
employees have a right not to join a union."
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3. A labor organization may peacefully picket one whose employees are not members of such organization.
4. A "labor dispute" under the terms of Section 87 (c), Chapter
97, '35 C.S.A. (commonly called State Norris-La Guardia Act) may
exist "regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee."
5. Even assuming that the sole object of the union was to compel
the employer to coerce his employees to join a labor union (to obtain
a closed shop) there is no merit to the argument that such differences
between employer and union do not amount to a "labor dispute."
6. One purpose of the state act is to permit the employee to become and remain a member of a labor organization even should the
employer succeed in making the employee enter into a "yellow dog"
contract.
7. It is not illegal for an employer and a labor union to enter
into an agreement whereby employer agreed to employ union men only.
8. Economic loss sustained by an employer because of the lawful
exercise of peaceful picketing is not recoverable.
9. The union could legally notify customers of the employer
transportation company of the picketing against the employer.
10. When members of a picketing union urge customers of
employer or others in unity of interest with the union not to utilize
plaintiff's transportation agency, this is a legal "material" boycott and
not an illegal secondary boycott.
11.
Where it is found that peaceful picketing was not wrongful,
a difference of opinion between union and employer about "fairness"
or "unfairness" is too shadowy or unsubstantial to require repression
by a court of equity merely because the pickets carried placards declaring, "This Firm Unfair to Teamsters Local Union No. 13."
12. The provision of the act, providing that in labor disputes
certain conduct dealing with rights, obligations and defenses of persons, as a matter of substantive law, shall not be subject to the harsh
remedy of injunctive repression, is not unconstitutional.
13. Acts of defendant union representative examined and found
not to have violated trial court's temporary restraining order; therefore
it was beyond jurisdiction of trial court to impose punishment for contempt.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Otto Bock. Mr. Justice Burke dissents.
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Ejectment.-No. 14602. Decided March 4, 1940-French, et al. V.

Golston. District Court, Hinsdale County. Hon. George W. Bruce,
Judge. On rehearing. Reversed with directions. En Banc.
FACTS: A. G., alleging fee title in himself, brought ejectment
against F. to recover possession of Roxy lode.
B. F. answered, admitting possession, denying other allegations;
and asserted title in himself by (1) eighteen years adverse possession,
(2) seven years claim and color of title with payment of taxes, and (3)
by assignment of squatter's right.

The reply denied all new matter.

C. The court found generally for G. and held that the tax deed
under which he claimed conveyed the fee, that the defenses were without
merit, and entered a decree in G.'s favor for possession.
D. History of title: In 1896, mining company filed a location
certificate on the Roxy lode, and in 1897 executed a lease to C. for
that part of land then enclosed by C. "during her ownership or occupancy of said house and stable." In 1898, company received a patent
to the Roxy lode. In 1917, B. and S. took out a tax deed on the property and the same year transferred it to H., B. and T. by warranty deed.
In 1917, C. quit-claimed to F. "all the buildings and improvements ...
(leased by the company to C.)

. . . running for a term" of 99 years

together with all her rights and privileges under her lease from the
company. The land and improvements were sometimes separately assessed. In 1924, the improvements were sold to the county and Certificate #5005 issued therefor. In 1930, the land was struck off to the
county and Certificate #6227 issued therefor. In 1936, the county
commissioners authorized the treasurer to assign the certificates for a
minimum sum of $500.00. In 1937, one McG., holder of a prior tax
sale certificate, acting through a daughter of F., redeemed in McG.'s name
from the sale evidenced by Certificate #6227, and received from the
treasurer a redemption certificate to that effect. A week later the treasurer
wrote McG. that this redemption certificate "was erroneously issued as
only owners can redeem," and informed him that he was holding the
money paid for the redemption certificate for him. McG. never called
for the money. The next day the treasurer issued to G., the tax deed
under which he brings this suit. It is based solely upon Certificate
#6227, and specifies only the price appearing on its face, i.e., $19.56,
plus subsequent -taxes, $16.44. F. had been in possession of some of
the improvements on the property for more than 18 years, and had
erected improvements thereon costing $20,000.00. F. had never paid
any taxes on the land, and had paid no taxes on the improvements since
1925.
HELD: 1. "It is fundamental that a plaintiff in ejectment must
recover, if at all, on the strength of his own title and not upon the weak-
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ness of that of his adversary." "Title in a third person is therefore
generally a good defense."
2. "Possession implies ownership until the contrary is shown
and prior possession is sufficient against a mere intruder."
3. "The defense of title in a third person is not available to a mere
intruder."
4. G.'s tax deed was invalid because one, T., had a treasurer's
deed to one-third of the property dated 1922 and duly recorded. T.
was not notified, and no sufficient reason appears for that failure. The
statute requires notice to all persons "having an interest or title of
record."
5.
G.'s tax deed was invalid for the additional reason that the
very certificate upon which G.'s deed was issued had been redeemed by
McG., holder of a former certificate. "He probably had a right to
redeem."
6. While the redemption certificate to McG. was outstanding the
treasurer was powerless to issue a deed.
7. McG. "was entitled to be heard, and, doubtless, if his redemption was cancelled, to reimbursement."
8. Before F., (a defendant in an ejectment suit) could take any
advantage of G.'s title, he was bound to show that he was no mere intruder. When F. put in evidence his possession, claims and improvements, plus the quit-claim deed and lease, ineffective as these were to
establish title, he clearly establishd his right to put G. on proof.
9.
The trial court found that F. held no such exclusive and adverse possession as is required to support the statute. His failure to pay
taxes defeated F.'s claims under the seven year statute. F. made no
serious attempt, and could make none, to support his claim to squatter's
right on public domain because the property was patented and that
patent had been of record for nearly twenty years before F. obtained
the assignment of the alleged interest of C.
10. Separate assessment, sale and certificate as to land and improvements was invalid and the two must be considered as one. "Hence
one who assumed to pay taxes solely on the improvements or solely on
the land was merely paying a part of the total tax on the real estate."
11.
While ejectment is, primarily, a legal action and concerns
itself only with legal titles (but neither party has shown legal title to
the Roxy.lode) the contrary is the rule in this jurisdiction.
12. An unqualified judgment for F. would relegate G. to a
statutory action to quiet title, which being out of possession, he could
not maintain, and his investment would inure to the benefit of F. who
has neither legal nor equitable claim thereon.
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13. An unqualified judgment for G. would, on the strength of
a bad tax deed, permit him to oust F. from long possession and seize
improvements worth many times his investment.
14. Having blundered in securing his tax deed, G. can have no
cause of complaint if he be made whole. Having long occupied the
premises without title, F. can have no cause of complaint if-he is obliged
to carry the tax burden which title would impose.
15. Judgment is therefore reversed with directions to the trial
court to ascertain the amount paid by.G., with statutory interest, and
enter judgment in his favor for possession, unless F., on or before sixty
days from the date thereof, shall pay said sum into court for G., in
which event the action shall be dismissed at F.'s costs.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.

Trust Agreement; Succession Tax: Constitutional Law; Pleading.No. 14434. Decided March 4, 1940-Miliken, etc. v. People.
County Court, Denver. Hon. C. E. Kettering, Judge. Affirmed in
part and remanded with directions. En Banc.
HELD:
1. Where it appears that before a grantee. under a
trust indenture, could obtain possession and enjoyment of the corpus
of the trust estate "as an individual", the death of the grantor is a necessary and indispensable precedent, the imposition of the state transfer
tax under Sec. 7 (d) Chapter 85, '35 C.S.A., is justifiable.
2. "The succession tax is one imposed on the privilege of receiving property-it is not laid on the donor but on the beneficiary."
3.
"The objective of the legislature in passing the succession tax
act was to prevent evasion of inheritance tax."
4. "The conveyance of the corpus of the estate under the trust
indenture was a 'transfer' of an interest in property within the meaning
of Section 3, Chapter 85, '35 C.S.A. Formal distinctions pertaining
to the law of real property, such as contingent and vested remainders
and the various niceties of the art of conveyancing are irrelevant criteria
in this field of taxation."
5.
"When there is a written opinion it serves as a precedent only
on the point decided: hence, an affirmance without written opinion
can not be considered by us as a precedent in subsequent litigation."
6. The title of the act does-not contain more than one subject,
and therefore the act is not unconstitutional on such ground.
7. The issues were made by the inheritance tax commissioner's
report to the county court, the entry of an order thereon fixing the tax,
giving notice to all interested parties, and the filing of written objections
to the assessment. Under this procedure, there is no implied admission
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of any fact in the objections, and it is not necessary for the state to
deny the new matter presented by the written objections.
8, If the grantee under the indenture contributed a sum of money
to the estate from her personal funds, which was reflected in the corpus
of the estate as of the date of death of the grantor, "it may be that she
is entitled to have that sum considered in the valuation of the property
transferred as of that time. Without expressing an opinion on this
issue, we deem it of sufficient importance to require the trial court to
hear, determine and make findings thereon."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard not participating. Mr. Justice Bouck concurs in the remanding and dissents
from the affirmance. Mr. Justice Young dissents.

Insurance; Automobiles; Election of Company to Repair Auto Rather
Than Pay Estimated Damages Under Collision Policy; Dismissal
of Suit for Damages Where Owner Refuses to Permit Insurance
Company to Repair Car. No. 14479. Decided February 5, 1940Home Mutual Insurance Co. of Iowa vs. Stewart. County Court,
Larimer County. Hon. Arthur E. March, Judge. Reversed. In
Department.
HELD:
1. Where, under a collision or upset insurance policy,
plaintiff's car is damaged and four bids are obtained, for repairing the
car, ranging from $175.00 to $320.00 and the insurance company within a reasonable length of time elects to repair the car rather than to pay
for the damages, where the policy so provides, the plaintiff may not
have the car repaired by a mechanic of his own choice, pay the highest
amount and then recover same from insurance company.
2. Insurance company's notice of election was made within a
reasonable time (19 days from accident); it was clear, positive, distinct, and unambiguous.
3. There can be no issue as to whether the repairs were suitable
or adequate until after the repairs are made, and the plaintiff never gave
the company a chance to make the repairs.
4. It would not be justice for the court to dismiss the plaintiff's
case merely because he had his car repaired and refused to permit the
company to do so after it had so elected where it appears that plaintiff
was actually damaged and that the company admits that it would have
cost $175.00 based upon the lowest bid obtained by it in good faith.
Plaintiff to recover $175.00 but to pay costs.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bouck concur.
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Quiet Title; Restrictions; Agreement Not to Sell or Lease to or Permit
Occupancy of Real Estate by Colored Persons. No. 14441. Decided
January 22, 1940-Steward v. Cronanet al. District Court, Denver. Hon. Otto Bock, Judge. Affirmed. En Banc.
FACTS:
A. Plaintiff, a colored person, sought to quiet title to
certain real estate in Denver on which he held a purchase contract obtained from the widow of one of the covenantors, and to avoid a certain restriction agreement under which persons of his race were prohibited from occupying premises in the restricted area.
B. All the property owners who were parties to the agreement
were made parties defendant, but only two of them answered. Plaintiff demurred to the answer; the demurrer was overruled: he elected to
stand thereon; and judgment was entered against him. The trial court
refused to enter default against the non-appearing defendants, and did
enter judgment in favor of appearing defendants.
C. The restriction clause is as follows:
"The undersigned for themselves and their heirs and assigns
covenant and agree not to sell or lease the said above described lots or
parcels of land owned by them respectively or any part thereof, to any
colored person or persons, and covenant and agree not to permit any
colored person or persons to occupy said premises during the period from
this date to January 1, 1941."
1. The restriction agreement is valid.
HELD:
2. The case of Chandler v. Siegler, 88 Colo. 1, 291 Pac. 822, is
not "obiter dictum" as applied to the facts of this case, and is the law.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice not participating.

Taxes; Mandamus to Compel Treasurer to Issue Certificate of Redemption for Lands Sold for Taxes. No. 14676. Decided February 5,
1940-TarabinoReal Estate Co. v. Dunlavy, etc. District Court,
Las Animas County. Hon. John L. East, Judge. Affirmed. In Department.
A. Company was fee owner of land sold for non-payFACTS:
ment of 1932 taxes. 'The certificate was assigned to C in July, 1939,
for $2,784.39. Had C paid the full face amount all the taxes, the
total would have been $3,847.51.
B. On Sept. 6, 1939, the company tendered the treasurer the
exact amount of C's payment, with statutory interest, etc., and demanded its certificate of redemption. The treasurer refused, claiming
the company must tender the full $3,847.51. The company brought
mandamus. The lower court sustained a demurrer to the alternative

writ.
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HELD: 1. The owner of the real estate must pay to the treasurer
the full amount demanded by him for the redemption, and may not
redeem by paying only what was paid by the purchaser of the certificate.
2.
"A certificate for land struck off to the county for failure
of bidders at the sale is issued by the treasurer to the county and subsequent taxes are endorsed thereon. Thereafter no taxes are payable until
redemption or sale."
"Such certificates may be sold by the treasurer
for the amount for which the land was struck off to the county, with
interest and penalties, or 'for such sum as the board of county commissioners . .

.

. may decide and authorize.' "

3.
The statute provides for redemption by payment to the treasurer, for the purchaser, of "the amount for which the certificate was
sold, plus interest, together with the amount of all taxes accruing on
such real estate after the sale, paid by the purchaser and endorsed on his
certificate of purchase. "To redeem the owner must refund taxes paid,
not money paid."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bock concur.

Workmen's Compensation; Dependents. No. 14666. Decided February 5, 1940-Regal Coal Co. et at. v. Jackvich. District Court,
Denver. Hon. George F. Dunklee, Judge. Reversed. In Department.
HELD:
1. Evidence as to. dependency of claimant upon deceased, examined and found to properly sustain commission's finding of
no dependency.
2.
"If the testimony on which claimant relied to establish dependency and on which the commission made a finding of no dependency was such that honest men fairly considering it might arrive at contrary conclusions, then an issue of fact was thereby presented and the
finding of the commission on that issue was binding on the district
court in its subsequent hearing of the case, and binds us on review."
3. The dependency of a sister is a question of fact.
4. The commission is a fact-finding body and as such is the sole
judge. of the credibility of the witnesses.
5.
Even though the testimony of a witness as to certain facts
may be uncontroverted by other direct testimony, it does not follow
that the facts testified to, as a matter of law, must be accepted as uncontroverted facts.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
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Criminal Law; Larceny; Evidence; Conversations;Hearsay. No. 14610.
Decided January 1, 1940. McPhee v. People. District Court, Denver. Hon. Stanley H. Johnson, Judge. Reversed. En Banc.
HELD:. 1. In a criminal action in which the defendant is being
prosecuted under a charge of larceny of an automobile, it was error for
the trial court, over defendant's objections and exceptions, to permit
the introduction into evidence of conversations between a co-conspirator
and a police officer, where such conversations did not take place in the
presence of the defendant.
2. The statements made by co-conspirator to the police officer
could not have been in furtherance of the conspiracy; in fact they were
in derogation of it, and were, therefore, not admissible against a defendant, out of whose presence they were made.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Justice Young, Mr. Justice
Bakke and Mr. Justice Burke dissent.

Criminal Law; Needlessly Killing Dogs; Statutory Construction. No.
14692. Decided January 22, 1940-Failing v. People. County
Court, Park County. Hon. Clarence S. Bullock, Judge. Reversed.
En Banc.
FACTS: Defendant convicted of needlessly killing dogs. He contended dogs were worrying cattle on his land although he owned neither
dogs nor cattle.
HELD: 1. In 1864, territorial legislature made it "lawful for
any person, at any time, to kill any dog which may be found running,
worrying, or injuring sheep." In 1872 it was made unlawful to needlessly kill any living creature. In 1877 the law was changed to include permission to kill dogs when found running, worrying or injuring cattle.
2. The people's contention that the needless killing of a dog is
prohibited even though such dog may be running or worrying cattle, and
that the defendant could have used a stick or fired a warning shot and
scared the dogs, is not tenable. No limitations are found in the statute,
and there is no question of malicious killing.
3. Where a criminal statute admits of two constructions, "that
which is more favorable to the defendant is to be preferred."
4. Where it appears that the dogs were barking at the cattle,
which were ten or fifteen feet away from them, and the cattle were facing the dogs with their heads down, this constituted "worrying" within
the meaning of the statute.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock.
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Criminal Law; Statutory Rape; Evidence; Letters; Reopening Case. No.
14688. Decided February 5, 1940-Monchego v. People. District
Court, Costilla County. Hon. John I. Palmer, Judge. Affirmed.
In Department.
HELD:
1. In a criminal case where defendant is charged with
statutory rape, it is not prejudicial error to admit in evidence a letter
from accused to prosecuting witness, showing their relations, where the
time involved was May, 1937, and the letter is dated January, 1937,
particularly where the evidence shows that it was written at a time when
they were closely associated.
2. No court can positively say that the time element alone is
controlling in such situations.
3. It was not error for trial court to permit the district attorney
to reopen the people's case after resting, for the purpose of showing
the defendant's age.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke.
Mr. Justice Burke concur.

Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
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.................
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